

Cavern and Tunnel Failures due to Adverse Structural Geology and Inadequate-in-the-Circumstances Support Designs


N. Barton

NB&A, Oslo, Norway

www.nickbarton.com



UNEXPECTED LOADINGS FROM UNEXPECTED STRUCTURAL GEOLOGIES, AND THE USE OF 'DEFORMATION-INVITING' *LATTICE GIRDERS* (OR STEEL ARCHES), WERE THE *COMBINED CULPRITS* OF THESE FAILURES.



THE FAILURES OCCURED IN THE TEMPORARY SUPPORT PHASE OF THE NATM-TYPE PROJECTS.

CONTENT of LECTURE

1. UNEXPECTED IRRESISTABLE FORCES, CONVENTIONAL SUPPORT OVER-COME
2. #1 METRO CAVERN FAILED DUE TO A FREAK MORPHOLOGICAL FEATURE
3. OTHER MASSIVE FAILURES DUE TO INADEQUATE SUPPORT
4. CONTRASTING DOUBLE-SHELL NATM AND SINGLE-SHELL NMT SUPPORT
5. THE 'SOFTNESS' OF LATTICE GIRDERS AND STEEL SETS: RRS PREFERABLE
6. #2 STEEL SETS IN HEP-CAVERN ARCH, OVER-LOADED IN 'IGNORED' FAULT ZONE
7. #3 NATM MOTORWAY TUNNEL FAILURE: INADEQUATE LATTICE GIRDER DESIGN
8. ISOTROPIC CONTINUUM CONTRA DISCONTINUOUS ANISOTROPIC REALITY
9. PROGRESSIVE FAILURE AND STRAIN INDUCED FAILURE CONCEPTS
10. CONCLUSIONS

Acknowledgements

1. Dr. Stavros Bandis † (former professor at Univ. of Thessaloniki)



2. Dr. Baotang Shen (senior scientist, CSIRO, Brisbane, Australia)


(For respectively their UDEC/3DEC and FRACOD modelling expertise and friendship)



COLLAPSE # 1

A METRO STATION CAVERN

**(with undiscovered 15,000 tons ridge-of-rock above
cavern arch in soil)**




*Eleven boreholes
around shaft and
eastern station
cavern.*

*L borehole / L tunnel
.....international
norm exceeded by a
factor of ≈ 2 to 4*

See core of SM-8704

WHAT WAS EXPECTED – ON AVERAGE – CONCERNING ROCK COVER






**Borehole SM-8704
drilled near centre of
(future) station cavern.**

**Rock was encountered at
18 m depth, at elevation
706m. This is 3 m above
the cavern roof.**


**Low rock cover was
'confirmed' – almost the
same as the mean of the
five nearest holes.**



**THE EXTRAORDINARY
REALITY: SUB-SURFACE
RIDGE-OF-ROCK
THAT WENT UNDETECTED**




**MOST OF THE COLLAPSED
ROCK IN THE CENTRE OF
THE CAVERN FELL 10 M,
REACHING ELEVATION
704-707 M, i.e.
REMAINING 1 TO 4M
ABOVE THE (ORIGINAL)
CAVERN ARCH.**

THIS SHOWS WHY THE RIDGE WAS MISSED WHEN DRILLING SM-8704



Linton, 1955. A classic model of differential weathering.

STAGE (b) is relevant to the origin of the cavern collapse







**‘Tors’ from Dartmoor, S.W.
England. Previously
surrounded by saprolite and
soil and sand**

**The sub-surface in areas of
deeply-weathered granite,
gneiss, limestone, etc. must
be extremely ‘rough’
beneath the smooth soil
cover.**





(Left) Conventional wedge loading
(Right) Unconventional quality change





BEFORE AND AFTER

A first bench had been finished in relation to the top-heading seen in the left photograph.





NO BOLTS IN THIS CASE DUE TO ASSUMED LOW COVER, AND FRAGMENTED WEATHERED ROCK. BUT $S(fr) \approx 40$ to 50 cm

LOOKS ROBUST – BUT WHAT IF POOR CONTACT WITH OVER-BREAK, AND NON-UNIFORM LOADING DUE TO A WEAK CONCEALED STRUCTURE?






January 2007 collapse.
Collapse so sudden that
pedestrians and minibus
sucked into void. (Seven die)
Thin arrows mark same
truck

The smooth
discontinuity
marking the limit
of the collapse



Discontinuity
marking 'end'
of collapse:
Very low JRC
(ALSO WATER)



After many months of excavation – discover folded 25 x 25 x 32 mm lattice-girders (and grouting tubes).
Note 40-50 cm of S(fr) lower-left.




After many months of excavation






- Smooth, weathered, curved, top-of-ridge-of-rock, $L > 30$ m.
- This jointed gneiss has fallen 8 to 10 m, but has remained like loosened 'pack-of-cards'.






Imagined progressive formation of ridge





In effect the (RMR III) ridge is preserved and the more jointed (RMR IV) surroundings deteriorate, eventually providing low-friction boundaries.



1. Possible early failure beneath 'elephant-feet' in 'left' wall. FRACOD model by Dr. Shen.

2. 'Intrinsic' (without support) failure with UDEC. (Dr. Bandis)

3. Loading on lattice girders and development of 'plastic hinges' prior to failure. (Dr. Bandis)



**BEFORE DISCUSSING THE NEXT TWO FAILURES
I WILL ILLUSTRATE:**

**TYPICAL COMPONENTS OF NATM AND NMT
*TUNNEL AND CAVERN SUPPORT
AND REINFORCEMENT***

CONTRASTING THE TYPICAL COMPONENTS of NATM and NMT:

1. 'DOUBLE-SHELL' ('NATM')

(Temporary): Sfr/Smr, B, steel/lattice girders,

Permanent: fleece, membrane, cast concrete, CCA


.....needs large work force

2. 'SINGLE-SHELL' (NMT)


(pre-grouting?) + B + Sfr + (RRS?)

..... needs small work force (x 1/10?)


WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS IN NATM?




Drill, charge, blast






Mucking



Steel rib, wire mesh,
shotcrete application





Rock bolting



(ASG, 2010. NATM: THE AUSTRIAN PRACTICE OF CONVENTIONAL TUNNELLING)

**OVER-BREAK? LATTICE-GIRDER FOOTINGS? BENCHING-DOWN – LATTICE GIRDER
EXTENSION? SEVERAL STAGES WITH QUESTIONABLE QUALITY, WHEN WITH
OVER-BREAK.....DUE TO PRESENCE OF ROCK AND NEED TO BLAST.**

LONG CONSTRUCTION TIMES: LABOUR INTENSIVE





THE TEMPORARY SUPPORT PHASE IS CRITICAL – AND TOO LONG – BECAUSE OF THE DELAY INVOLVED IN PERFORMING ALL THESE FINAL-LINING OPERATIONS



**ADEQUATE CONTACT WITH
THE ROCK? (IT IS NOT EASY)**

**ADEQUATE FOOTING STIFFNESS?
ADEQUATE RESISTANCE WHEN
'POINT' LOADED? OWN
DEFORMABILITY? ACTUALLY A
VERY 'SOFT' SYSTEM, THEREFORE
CAN BE UNSAFE WHEN WAITING
FOR THE LINING.**





LEFT: Ward
et al. 1983.
RIGHT:
Barton and
Grimstad,
1994.



The water-proof membrane phase. Difficult if over-break.

Approximately 12 to 15 km of membrane welds per 1 km of tunnel.
(Like garden swimming pool REPAIR).




FINAL STAGE OF NATM – SHOWN BELOW – IS THE PERMANENT CONCRETE LINING.



An earlier (temporary support) phase of the same project.....not very convincing level of safety. Note mesh and lattice-girder.




What about the reality of over-break?



NMT - the Norwegian Method of Tunnelling


1. Q-system logging for selecting support class
 2. S(fr)
 3. B (utg) - CT-type
 4. RRS (rib-reinforced shotcrete arches, bolted)
 5. *PRE-GROUTING FOR DRY TUNNEL, DISPLACING WATER*
 6. *FREE-STANDING, BOLTED PC-ELEMENTS WITH OUTER MEMBRANE for DRY TUNNEL, BUT ALLOWING DRAINAGE*
- (NMT is 'single-shell'.....NATM is 'double-shell')




Grimstad and Barton,
1993 Q-update: **S(mr)**
changed to **S(fr)**

REINFORCEMENT CATEGORIES

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1) Unsupported | 6) Fiber reinforced shotcrete and bolting, 9 - 12cm, Sfr+B |
| 2) Spot bolting, sb | 7) Fiber reinforced shotcrete and bolting, 12 - 15cm, Sfr+B |
| 3) Systematic bolting, B | 8) Fiber reinforced shotcrete > 15cm, reinforced ribs of shotcrete and bolting, Sfr, RRS+B |
| 4) Systematic bolting (and unreinforced shotcrete, 4-10cm, B(+S)) | 9) Cast concrete lining, CCA |
| 5) Fiber reinforced shotcrete and bolting, 5-9cm, Sfr+B | |



S(fr) used
in Norway
and
Sweden
since
1979






- The old-fashioned method of temporary support S(mr) which is still recommended in NATM. (A deliberately chosen example showing 'shadow' problems)



**Do not use
S(mr), especially
not where there
is over-break!**

S(mr) was discontinued in
early 1980 when
using single-
shell Q-based
NMT.



OVERBREAK

IF

$$J_n/J_r \geq 6$$

J_n = number of sets

J_r = roughness

6/1.0

9/1.5

12/2

15/3

(DESPITE FOUR JOINT SETS, TOO MUCH ROUGHNESS AND DILATION)

In photos:

$$J_n/J_r = 9/1.5$$

rough

$J_r = 1.5$

smooth

1.0

slickensided

0.5

PLANAR

rough

$J_r = 3$

smooth

2

slickensided



1.5

UNDULATING






Principles of CT bolt: Right: Joint/crack deformation next to the bolt *does not initiate* a potential process of corrosion, which it might in the case of a conventional bolt without the PVC sleeve. 4-layers of protection remain.




When compared to latic-girders which are unbolted, **RRS** (rib-reinforced shotcrete arches) with their systematic bolting, *are far more reliable for faulted rock masses.*

S(fr) arches take care of the over-break.

Barton and
Grimstad,
2014 –
with
details of
RRS in
boxes





**EXAMPLE OF PRE-INJECTED SHALES:
110 m² TWIN-TRACK HIGH SPEED
RAIL TUNNEL**

**IF THE CHOICE IS *SINGLE-SHELL*
NMT: **ECONOMY AND
PERFORMANCE ARE ENHANCED
WITH PRE-INJECTION****





NMT high-speed rail tunnel 110m²

1. Pre-injection (of shales, limestones, igneous dykes)
2. S(fr)
3. B (CT-type)
4. (RRS not needed due to pre-injection)

COLLAPSE # 2


AN NATM TWIN-MOTORWAY TUNNEL


(with light, inadequate, temporary support, and anisotropic challenges from an actual rock mass)



OPTIMISTIC 'LIGHT' LATTICE-GIRDERS and UNREINFORCED SHOTCRETE. NO ROCK BOLTS.


- **OPTIMISTIC AXISYMMETRIC UNIFORM LOADING ASSUMED.**
- **WHAT HAPPENS WITH VERTICALLY JOINTED PHYLLITE?**
- **WHAT HAPPENS WITH OVER-BREAK AND A WEATHERED DIKE?**





THE OPTIMISTS


A NOT QUITE SO SIMPLE 2D
'REALITY' – WITH THE
STRONG EFFECT OF A
SLOPING HILLSIDE NOW
INCLUDED








WEATHERED PHYLLITE (WITH
STEEP DIP) AS SEEN IN THE
NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE
TWIN TUNNELS

**SOME OF THE HARSH 2D
'REALITY', AND RAPID
PROGRESSION TOWARDS
MASSIVE FAILURE**
(Dr. Stavros Bandis, UDEC)





Due to limitations of the design,
retrogressive failure back to the
portal. All 140 m lost (LATER X 2!)



3DEC modelling by
Dr. Stavros Bandis



THEN THE LEFT-SIDE.....FIRST THE RIGHT-SIDE
($\approx$ 140 m COLLAPSE)($\approx$ 140 m COLLAPSE)

SOIL, THEN SAPROLITE, THEN WEATHERED PHILLITE, DIKE




ROTATED
ROAD,
TREES
AND
TELEGRAPH
POLE (after
failure of
second tube)

COLLAPSE # 3

CAVERN ARCH WITH STEEL SETS

(with no change of design when encountering fault zone on one side of the arch)

COLLAPSE IN PARTLY COMPLETED D/S SURGE CHAMBER ARCH.



- Tragically, six workers caught in the sudden collapse.
- First collapse $\approx 35,000 \text{ m}^3$





The attempt to remove some 15,000 m³ of the fallen rock, revealed the destruction of the 'heavy' steel sets in the arch.

(It was too dangerous to continue)

A total of 70,000 m³ may now have fallen. A cavity with approximate dimensions L x H x W of (50-60) m x (40-50) m x (30-35) m has to be stabilized, then victims recovered.



(FURTHER) LIMITATIONS OF LATTICE-GIRDERS

(OK for soil, saprolite, but when blasting begins in rock tunnel: over-break. The lattice-girder may then behave in a very deformable way.)



WHAT
HAPPENS
TO LATTICE
GIRDERS
WHEN A
TUNNEL (OR
CAVERN)
CROSSES A
MAJOR JOINT
OR FAULT?

**HIGHLY NON-
UNIFORM
LOADING IS
INEVITABLE.**

BESIDES THE POTENTIAL FOR NON-UNIFORM LOADING OF INADEQUATE SUPPORT (LATTICE GIRDERS) THE OTHER 'VIOLATION' OF CONVENTIONAL ASSUMPTIONS IS THAT THE ROCK MASS RESISTANCE ***MAY NOT*** CONSISTS OF ' $c + \sigma_n \tan \phi$ ' (LINEAR M-C or NON-LINEAR H-B)


PROGRESSIVE FAILURE: APPLYING TO LARGE TUNNELS, CAVERNS, AND MAJOR SLOPES WILL OFTEN COMPROMISE THE '*c plus ϕ* ' ASSUMPTIONS.



BIGGEST OPEN-PIT MINE FAILURE EVER: KENNEKOTT COPPER BINGHAM MINE IN UTAH – MAYBE 70,000,000 m³ OF WASTE ROCK AND ORE. CAUSED 5.1 Mag. AND 4.1 Mag. SEISMIC EVENTS, WITH 1½ HOURS SEPARATION.

NO LOSS OF LIFE – DUE TO MONITORED PROGRESSIVE FAILURE. SO FAILURE WAS PRESUMABLY STEP-BY-STEP OVER-COMING OF THE VARIOUS AVAILABLE STRENGTH (OR WEAKNESS) COMPONENTS.





LARGE-SCALE LOADING / OR UN-LOADING OF ROCK MASSES (i.e. big slopes, big dams, big underground excavations) IS NOT DESCRIBED BY CONVENTIONAL ' $c + \sigma_n \tan \phi$ ' (i.e. Mohr-C, Hoek-B)

THERE MAY BE FOUR (non-linear) COMPONENTS, EACH MOBILIZED AT DIFFERENT STRAINS.

THE MOST IMPORTANT COMPONENT IS THE JOINT SETS, (not an algebraically modified intact rock 'H-B strength' as optimistically used in continuum modelling).

SO WE CANNOT/SHOULD NOT ADD THE COHESIVE AND FRICTIONAL STRENGTH COMPONENTS, AS IF ALL RESISTED TOGETHER AT THE SAME SHEAR STRAIN/DISPLACEMENT.

CONCLUSIONS

- 1. Massive unexpected failures of tunnels and caverns may be a 'logical' combination of unexpected non-uniform loading, non-uniform strength, and 'unexpected' poor performance of some conventional tunnel/cavern support methods.**
- 2. If isotropic continuum modelling is performed to 'design' tunnel / cavern support, one must expect surprises when the anisotropic and non-uniform reality engages with the support. A big part of the problem arises due to over-break and non-uniform structural geology.**
- 3. Lattice girders (and steel sets) are fabricated from the hardest of materials typically used in civil engineering: steel. Surprisingly, they nevertheless represent one of the *most deformable components* of tunnel /cavern support (due to over-break, non-uniform loads, bending, deforming footings).**
- 4. Bolted (where possible) steel-fiber-and-steel-bar reinforced arches of S(fr) called RRS ('rib-reinforced shotcrete' in NMT single-shell, Q-system) are in intimate contact with the rock, even when there is over-break, and they do not require (deformable) footings since they are 1m c/c bolted.**